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Green Paper on Land Reform: Overview and Challenges 1 
 
W Erlank  
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The latest Green Paper on Land Reform2 was published on 16 September 2011 and 
is commonly referred to as the Green Paper on Land Reform, 2011. This Green 
Paper represents the latest development in a long history of land reform in South 
Africa.3 Unfortunately, despite all the developments and legislative industriousness 
                                        
  Wian Erlank. Hons.BA (Classical Literature) LLB LLM (International Trade Law) LLD (Stell). Senior 
Lecturer in Law at North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, South Africa. Advocate of the 
High Court of South Africa. Email: Wian.Erlank@nwu.ac.za 
1  Paper presented at the KAS/NWU Colloquium on the Green Paper in Land Reform: Challenges 
and Opportunities held on 27 July 2012 in Muldersdrift, South Africa. Paper is based on a 
submission written by W Erlank and N de Havilland on behalf of the Centre for Constitutional 
Rights (CFCR) to the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform in 2011.  
 
2  Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR), Green Paper on Land Reform, 
2011. GN 639 in GG 34607 of 16 September 2011 (Hereafter referred to as the Green Paper).  
3  See in general Pienaar 2014 PER 642, Kloppers and Pienaar 2014 PER 677, Mostert 2014 PER 
760-762. Since the advent of South Africa's new democratic dispensation, quite a large body of 
legislation dealing with land (reform) issues has been enacted. These include the following: 
Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act 108 of 1991; Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act 
112 of 1991 and the Less Formal Township Establishment Act 113 of 1991. Sections 8 and 120-
122 of the (interim) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 dealt with issues 
relating to land, while Section 28 was criticised due to its specific lack of dealing with land reform 
matters. After 1993 the following acts followed: Distribution and Transfer of Certain Land Act 
119 of 1993; State Land Disposal Act 48 of 1961; Provision of Certain Land for Settlement Act 
126 of 1993; Land Titles Adjustment Act 111 of 1993; Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994; 
Land Administration Act 2 of 1995; Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995; Land Reform 
(Labour Tenants) Act 2 of 1996; Deeds Registries Amendment Act 11 of 1996; Communal 
Properties Association Act 28 of 1996; and the Interim Protection of Land Rights Act 31 of 1996. 
In 1996, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 followed, where especially section 
25 (the property clause) set out the rights and obligations of both private owners as well as the 
state for the protection of property on the one hand, and the procedure for land reform on the 
other. Therefore, a new land policy was issued after a consultative process (referred to as the 
White Paper on Land Reform, 1996). After 1996 new legislation enacted to ensure land reform, 
include inter alia the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (ESTA); Prevention of Illegal 
Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE); Housing Act 107 of 1997; 
National Water Act 36 of 1998; Water Services Act 108 of 1997; and the Communal Land Rights 
Act 11 of 1994 (CLaRA – which has in the meantime been found to be unconstitutional). For an 
extensive analysis and discussion of the South African Land Reform Programme and issues 
relating to it see Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Law of Property 585-665; Carey Miller and 
Pope Land Title 313-455. 
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since 1991, the fragmented land tenure system that resulted from Apartheid has not 
been successfully rectified.4  
 
The Green Paper makes the following proposals. It states that the vision for land 
reform consists of four aspects.5 The first is a new four-tier system of land tenure6 
(leasehold for public land; freehold with limited extent for privately owned land, 
freehold with precarious tenure and obligations for foreign owned land; and 
communal tenure for communally owned land). The second is clearly defined 
property rights7 governed by a land administration system. The third is creating 
secure forms of long-term land tenure for resident non-citizens who invest in food 
sovereignty and livelihood security.8 The fourth is facilitating effective land use 
planning and regulatory systems.9  
 
With this vision in mind, the Green Paper states that there are three principles that 
underpin land reform.10 These are the de-racialising of the rural economy, 
democratic and equitable land allocation and lastly a sustained production discipline 
for food security. It is further suggested by the Green Paper that amongst others, a 
Land Management Commission;11 a Land-Valuer General12 and a Land Rights 
Management Board13 with local management committees should be created as 
programmes and institutions where applicable.  
 
                                        
4  See Kloppers and Pienaar 2014 PER 678; Du Plessis 2014 PER 834-836; Mostert 2014 PER 799-
800. See especially Mostert 2014 PER 796-798 for a discussion of Minister of Minerals and 
Energy v Agri South Africa 2012 5 SA 1 (SCA) as well as Tongoane v National Minister for 
Agriculture and Land Affairs 2010 8 BCLR 741 (CC). 
5  DRDLR Green Paper 6. 
6  DRDLR Green Paper para 3.1 6, para 6.4 7-8. Pienaar 2014 PER 561. 
7  DRDLR Green Paper para 3.2 6. 
8  DRDLR Green Paper para 3.3 6, para 6.4(c) 8. 
9  DRDLR Green Paper para 3.4 6, para 6.5-7.2. 
10  DRDLR Green Paper para 4.1 6. 
11  DRDLR Green Paper para 6.2(c). 
12  DRDLR Green Paper para 6.2(d). 
13  DRDLR Green Paper para 6.2(e). 
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While the Green Paper contains some excellent proposals and ideas,14 it is also 
extremely vague, contains a lot of florid political rhetoric15 and creates a lot of 
uncertainty about the implementation and possible unconstitutionality of some of the 
proposals.16 The following are the main issues that have been identified by 
stakeholders (economists, commercial farmers, unions and emerging farmers) as 
problematical:17 Firstly, the possible cap on the size of commercial farmland is 
deemed to be undesirable since it would entail that commercial products would be 
produced on leased property. This would result in the fact that farmers would be 
unable to secure funding since they would not be able to use the leased land as 
security. Secondly, the proposal that the Land Management Commission would have 
the power to bypass the jurisdiction of the courts is identified as a clearly 
unconstitutional suggestion. Thirdly, the implementation of the Land-Valuer General 
as the institution that would determine the value of land for taxation; rating and for 
land expropriation purposes seems problematic. This could possibly be 
unconstitutional since Section 25 of the Constitution states that the compensation 
for expropriation must be determined by a court of law in the absence of an 
agreement between the affected parties. In the fourth place, the issue that seems to 
                                        
14  Such as the concept of the Land Management Commission, the Land-Valuer General and the 
Land Rights Management Board – however, the actual implementation and some of the 
envisaged powers that these institutions are given creates uncertainty and in some cases appear 
to be clearly unconstitutional. 
15  Found throughout the introduction as well as the final clause. Green Paper 3-5, 12-13. See also 
Steward 2011 http://www.givengain.com/cgi-bin/giga.cgi?cmd=cause_dir_news_item&cause_id 
= 2137&news_id=111897&cat_id=1596. 
16  These issues are discussed in detail in other articles in this issue and as such will only be looked 
at in passing in this article. See Mostert 2014 PER 760-763,805,809-816; Pienaar 2014 PER 662-
664. 
17  See Child 2011 http://mg.co.za/article/2011-09-21-green-paper-on-land-reform-offers-no-
guidance; SAPA 2011 http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/SAIRR-slams-land-reform-
green-paper-20110902; AFP 2011 http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/Black-farmers-
selling-land-back-to-whites-20110831; Du Toit 2011 http://anothercountryside.wordpress.com 
/2011/09/26/comment-on-the-newly-released-green-paper-on-land-reform/; Hall 2011 http: 
//www.timeslive.co.za/opinion/ commentary/2011/09/25/grey-fog-in-a-green-paper; Hartley 
2012 http://www.bdlive.co.za/ articles/2011/09/01/land-reform-proposals-run-into-heavy-
fire;jsessionid=23A948BECF96FDFE5FB 52F8EF0216467.present2.bdfm; SAPA 2012 
http://mg.co.za/article/2012-05-31-land-reform-green-paper-is-an-attack-on-white-farmers; 
Steward 2012 http://www.politicsweb.co.za/ politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71654?oid 
=303370&sn=Detail&pid=71616; Steward 2011 http://www.givengain.com/cgi-bin/giga.cgi? 
cmd=cause_dir_news_item&cause_id=2137&news_id =111897&cat_id=1596; Farmer's Weekly 
2011 http://www.farmersweekly.co.za/ article.aspx?id=10490&h=Unpacking-the-Green-Paper. 
See also Matlala 2014 PER 854 - 858. 
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create a lot of concern is the fact that the land tenure system does not seem to 
address the needs and expectations of the population with regard to land reform. It 
would seem as if foreigners and wealthy land owners would be able to have 
ownership (albeit in freehold terms – harking back to the feudal system), while 
emerging black farmers will not be getting ownership and will only get leasehold on 
property.18 This appears to be discriminatory. It also does not address the needs of 
people who live on communal land and eventually want to acquire ownership of the 
land. 
It should also be borne in mind that South Africa has to adhere to both the 
constitutional as well as international obligations with regard to the protection of 
property, land and ownership.19 With this in mind, the most prominent features of 
the Green Paper will be set out below and the more problematically issues 
highlighted.20  
 
The Green Paper 
 
Clause21 1 (Introduction) 
The introduction22 to the Green Paper reads like a political manifesto,23 making bold 
superfluous claims that creates more uncertainty and doubt about the rest of the 
document than all the substantive contents combined inside. 
 
                                        
18  Pienaar 2014 PER 653-655. 
19  Section 39 of the Constitution determines that when interpreting the Bill of Rights (which 
contains the so-called property clause in Section 25) international law must be considered and 
foreign law may be considered. "39. Interpretation of Bill of Rights (1) When interpreting the Bill 
of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum – (a) must promote the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom; (b) must consider 
international law; and (c) may consider foreign law." S 39 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996. For an in depth discussion of this issue see Van der Walt Constitutional 
Property Law 22-56. 
20  Since this article also serves to tie together the rest of the articles in this special edition of the 
journal, I will quote the sections of the Green Paper in the footnotes for reference purposes – 
even where there are no serious issues identified in the main text. 
21  Both clause and paragraph are used to denote the sections in the Green Paper, and should be 
regarded as interchangeable. 
22  DRDLR Green Paper Clause 1 (Introduction) 3-5. 
23  Mostert 2014 PER 760-761, 769. 
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The continued reference to both anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggles muddles 
the issue by creating uncertainty with regard to the scope of the problems to be 
addressed. The current land reform programme focuses on the effects of and 
injustices created by apartheid after 1913.24 However, the continued reference to 
"anti-colonial struggles" creates the impression that the Green Paper might wish to 
address all shifts in the ownership and control of land since the inception of 
colonialism in South Africa. This might reach back to 1652 when South Africa's 
colonisation began. As such, stating that: "(a)ll anti-colonial struggles are at the core 
about two things: repossession of land lost through force or deceit; and, restoring 
the centrality of indigenous culture";25 and then continuing by referring to 
colonialists in general and colonialisms' effect on culture in particular, creates 
uncertainty about the direction of land reform rather than providing guidelines. With 
reference to this issue, the following questions come to mind.26 Firstly, is the focus 
of land reform now shifted to addressing all imbalances created by colonialism since 
1652? Secondly, since the struggle to rectify such imbalances of colonialism focuses 
on the "repossession of land lost through force or deceit …", will this reference to 
"force" also be used to rectify the change of territory and land ownership between 
the indigenous tribes/nations27 themselves?28 Thirdly, will this take into account the 
concerns and claims of the aboriginal residents of Southern Africa? These are not 
questions that are unique to South Africa and the struggle for access to and 
                                        
24  See in general Kloppers and Pienaar 2014 PER 679-687 for a discussion of the Natives Land Act 
27 of 1913; the Natives Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936; The Group Areas Act 41 of 1950; The 
Group Areas Act 36 of 1966; the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act 108 of 1991 and 
how this effected the current problematical situation created by Apartheid. See also Matlala 2014 
PER 833-834. 
25  DRDLR Green Paper 3. 
26 Cf Steward 2011 http://www.givengain.com/cgi-bin/giga.cgi?cmd=cause_dir_news_item 
&cause_id=2137&news_id=111897&cat_id=1596. 
27  I make use of the word "tribes", however, as an illustration of the new phenomenon of micro-
aggression, this terminology was slated as being racist. However, after conferring with a number 
of colleagues who feel that "tribes" is the correct word, I will keep it in the text. The proposed 
non-racist term was suggested to be "nations". However, as with all terminology in law – the use 
of "nation" has a very narrow meaning and is usually applied to the field of international law as 
to denote a country with fixed borders. 
28  This can also be referred to as "indigenous colonialisation". The fact that many of the indigenous 
tribes of Southern Africa constantly and forcefully changed the ownership and land use patterns 
amongst themselves by means of war and conflict did not immediately change after the 
inception of colonialism. See especially the period referred to as the Difaqane or Mfecane in the 
early 19th century. Hamilton The Mfecane Aftermath; Omer-CooperThe Zulu Aftermath. 
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ownership of land has been a key aspect throughout history.29 However, due to 
these constantly changing systems and patterns of land ownership and control, a 
line has to be drawn somewhere to promote legal certainty and facilitate, rather 
than hinder productive land reform. Rhetoric of the continuing anti-colonialist 
struggles is futile if not properly and equitably addressed so as to redress all the 
wrongs caused by colonisation, both from within and without Southern Africa. 
 
It should also be borne in mind that the historical connotations of land use and 
ownership over the past few hundred years have to keep track of the change in 
technology, social and economic development and the industrial revolution. One 
needs to acknowledge that all South African citizens are also "South Africans" - 
without a need to reference culture, colour or creed. All South Africans live in a 
modern South Africa, which is indeed a modern nation state and needs to both fit 
into and compete with the rest of the modernised world. In order to do so, one 
cannot continuously hark back to the sentiments of the good old days of yonder, 
when land was deemed to be an unlimited resource and many of the indigenous 
peoples in South Africa spanned and migrated without hindrance across current 
national boundaries. One needs to acknowledge that one must adapt to change and 
use it to the advantage of everyone in the country. There is, of course, a need to 
focus on imbalances in ownership patterns and the wrongs of the past, but this must 
not be done to the tune of insubstantial, unsustainable and unproductive political 
rhetoric as contained in the first section of the Green Paper. 
 
The order in which the key parameters for measuring development are listed creates 
doubts about the vision and ultimate success of the land reform programme. It is 
listed as "social, political, administrative, cultural, institutional and economic".30 It is 
deeply concerning that the economic parameter is placed last in the list, since 
without economic competitiveness, participation and development, South Africa 
faces the future of its neighbours who chose to ignore the economic parameters in 
favour of overtly idealistic political ideals. Without economic development and 
                                        
29  Mostert 2014 PER 764-765. 
30  DRDLR Green Paper 4. 
W ERLANK                                                                       PER / PELJ 2014(17)2 
 
620 
stability, none of the other ideals will be sustainable and this will be to the detriment 
of everyone in South Africa. 
It is also unfortunate that the introduction to the substantive part of the Green 
Paper ends with an unnecessary reference to the capacity of the disposed to forgive 
and the threat that "this goodwill should not be taken for granted".31 This reference 
does not take into account the efforts and progress that all South Africans have 
made since 1994 to create a new Ubuntu between all members of the Rainbow 
Nation. It also does not acknowledge the fact that many white South Africans have 
bona fide strong historic, legal and moral claims to the land that they farm on, or 
take into account the fact that a substantial proportion of agricultural land has 
changed hands from white to black since 1994. 
 
Against this background, I now comment on the specific substantive clauses of the 
Green Paper. 
 
Clause 2 (Problem statement)32 
Even though Clause 2 is described as the problem statement, it is not clear how the 
three sub-clauses in the problem statement contribute to defining the problem, since 
they do not in fact set forth a clear problem statement. Sub-clauses 2.1 and 2.2 
seem to provide a justification for state investment in land reform, while this is 
clearly not the central issue at stake in this Green Paper. Sub-clause 2.3 is also 
extremely vague and does not in fact contain a clearly identifiable problem 
statement. It is suggested that the current content of the problem statement should 
be removed and replaced with clear and concise content that actually contains the 
real problem statement. 
                                        
31  DRDLR Green Paper 5. 
32  "The need to instill (sic) national identity, shared citizenship and autonomy-fostering service 
delivery are the primary reasons why the State must continue to invest in the transformation of 
land relations (systems and patterns of land control and ownership) in our country. 2.2 The 
rationale behind state investment in, and the enduring demand for, land in South Africa is to be 
found in the historical background of what has been described by some scholars as 
'accumulation by dispossession'. 2.3 The current economic structure of South Africa, as a result 
of this historical process and phenomenon, has produced, and continues to produce, net factors 
which combine to undermine the creation of conditions which are conducive to fostering social 
cohesion and development amongst those historically dispossessed of their land." DRDLR Green 
Paper para 2.1.. 
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Clause 3 (Vision for Land Reform)33 
Clause 3 sets out the government's vision for land reform. In clause 3.134 the 
proposed four-tier system of land tenure remains vague as to how it would affect 
the current system of tenure and ownership.35 This should be clarified, since the 
implications are that current vested ownership that is protected by the Constitution 
might be affected in such a way as to be unconstitutional.36 It is also unclear 
whether a restriction of ownership in terms of the size of a farm will be one of the 
consequences with the resultant unknown effect that this will have on food 
production (which makes use of production methods of scale to be economically 
viable).37 
It is unclear why the focus seems to be on subsistence living in a rural 
environment.38 Even if people who live in rural areas are given more secure rights in 
terms of the proposed system of tenure, these rights will promote security of 
housing but not necessarily result in productive livelihoods (or food security). This is 
due to the fact that the ability to be productive in the rural environment usually 
equates to being productive in the agricultural industry.39 In order to be productive 
and be able to develop and make beneficial use of rural (usually agricultural) land, a 
person would normally need to obtain financing for such development.40 These so-
called more secure rights will in all probability not be sufficient to satisfy the 
reasonable economic security (real security) expectations of financial institutions. 
Financial institutions are able to provide loans because they can get secure property 
rights over the property of the lender by means of a bond.41 If the lender defaults on 
the loan repayment, the bondholder can eventually effect the sale of the bonded 
                                        
33  See Pienaar 2014 PER 653; Mostert 2014 PER 765, 770-773; Matlala 2014 PER 848-849. 
34  "A re-configured single, coherent four-tier system of land tenure, which ensures that all South 
Africans, particularly rural blacks, have a reasonable access to land with secure rights, in order to 
fulfil their basic needs for housing and productive livelihoods." DRDLR Green Paper para 3.1. 
35  Mostert 2014 PER 770-771. 
36  See in general Mostert as to why the Green Paper is not necessarily unconstitutional. 
37  Mostert 2014 PER 779. 
38  Mostert 2014 PER 779-780. 
39  See in general Matlala 2014 PER 834-835. 
40  For the amount of debt tied to agriculture, see Matlala 2014 PER 847. 
41  See also Matlala 2014 PER 850. 
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property to recover its costs.42 The current worldwide financial crisis stems from the 
problem that financial institutions did not have enough collateral when debtors 
defaulted on their loan repayments.43 In the context of the focus on development 
that the Green Paper seems to promote, this will result in the holders of these 
"secure" tenure rights not being able to do anything with these rights, apart from 
having secure housing rights and maybe being able to practice basic subsistence 
farming. For credit security purposes, a financial institution will not be able to 
acquire any value from such proposed tenure rights. It could be equated to a person 
who is renting a property and then trying to use the right to live in the house as 
collateral for obtaining finance. Because of these problems with the security 
contained in the proposed tenure system it is suggested that the whole system, as 
well as the justifications for the creation of such a system, be re-evaluated. 
 
In itself, Clause 3.244 does not contain any problems and the concept of clearly 
defined property rights is supported. However, it should be noted that when keeping 
in mind the current state of land reform, the capacity of government to administer 
and govern land issues is severely in doubt. As such it should be approached with 
circumspection. 
 
Clause 3.345 is problematic, since it is vague and creates uncertainty with regard to 
the possible limitations on ownership by foreigners. It is also deeply concerning that 
food sovereignty,46 livelihood security and agro-industrial development for South 
Africa are only addressed in terms of how foreigners will contribute.47 As such it 
                                        
42  This is of course a very simplified explanation, with numerous preceding steps leading to the 
final court-ordered sale in execution of the property.  
43  This is also sometimes referred to as the subprime crises. See in general Schiller The Subprime 
Solution 1-5; Eichengreen et al 2012 Journal of International Money and Finance 1299-1318.  
44  "Clearly defined property rights sustained by a fair, equitable and accountable land 
administration system within an effective judicial and 'governance' system." DRDLR Green Paper 
para 3.2. 
45  "Secure forms of long-term land tenure for resident non-citizens engaged in appropriate 
investments which enhance food sovereignty and livelihood security, and improved agro-
industrial development." DRDLR Green Paper para3.3. 
46  See Matlala 2014 PER 837-838. 
47  Ironically, this is in contrast to the support that South African farmers get from other African 
(and now European) governments to farm outside South Africa. 
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creates the perceptions that government is not serious about these issues as a vision 
for land reform; that government is putting the responsibility of food production and 
security for South Africa in the hands of foreigners; and that government is 
promoting the interests of non-citizens to the detriment of citizens.48 It is clear that 
the purpose of land reform is firstly to place land back in the hands of South 
Africans. The current perception that is created is that this could lead to 
corporatisation of the agricultural sector, with the result that foreign agribusinesses 
would buy and operate large farms and then distribute the produce to their countries 
of origin.49 This clause should be changed so as to remove references to foreign 
ownership and to focus on the need for the promotion and maintenance of food 
sovereignty, livelihood security and improved agro-industrial development to be the 
responsibility and privilege of South African citizens.50 
 
Clause 3.451 states that there is a central vision of effective land use planning and 
regulatory systems. 
 
Clause 4 (Principles Underlying Land Reform) 
Clause 4.152 enumerates a number of principles, being the de-racialising of the rural 
economy;53 democratic and equitable land allocation and use across race, gender 
and class; and a sustained production discipline for food security. The clause does 
not seem to raise any red flags and should in general be supported. However, it is 
proposed that due to the importance of food security, it should be the first rather 
than last principle to be mentioned. In its current form it creates the impression that 
                                        
48  See also Matlala 2014 PER 838-843 on the migration of both white and black farmers out of 
South Africa. 
49  Mdluli 2011 http://www.iol.co.za/business/news/land-reform-proposals-under-attack-1.1129918. 
50  See Matala 839. 
51  "Effective land use planning and regulatory systems which promote optimal land utilization in all 
areas and sectors; and, effectively administered rural and urban lands, and sustainable rural 
production systems." DRDLR Green Paper para 3.4.  
52  "The principles which underpin land reform are three-fold: (a) de-racialising the rural economy; 
(b) democratic and equitable land allocation and use across race, gender and class; and, (c) a 
sustained production discipline for food security". DRDLR Green Paper para 4.1. See Matlala 
2014 PER 845-846.  
53  Matlala suggests that the land reform discourse also has to be deracialised. See Matlala 2014 
PER 854. 
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it is the last consideration to be taken into account while implementing land reform, 
whilst it should be the first. I would also like to highlight the fact that while these 
principles are contained in this sub-clause, the main body of the Green Paper does 
not in fact seem to support these principles. 
 
Clause 4.254 states that the long-term goal of land reform is social cohesion and 
development. 
 
Clause 5 (Current Challenges and Weaknesses: Rationale for Change)55 
In general, the content of this clause is unproblematic. However, it is proposed that 
less emphasis should be placed on the weaknesses of the current land acquisition 
strategy and especially on the willing buyer, willing seller56 model. It seems as if it is 
accurate to say that the system is not working.57 However, the causes of the failure 
of the current land reform system should not be placed solely at the feet of some of 
the problems created by the willing-buyer willing-seller model.58 This is especially 
clear when taking into account the lack of capacity and performance by the 
government as acknowledged in Clause 9 of the Green Paper in general.59 Taking 
into account the broad-scale failure of government in the successful implementation 
and administration of the current land reform programme, the focus should rather 
be on the administration and governance failures in the current responsible 
government departments.60 Examples include the outstanding claims against the 
                                        
54  "The long-term goal of land reform is social cohesion and development. In this text, the concept 
'development' refers to shared growth and prosperity, relative income equality, full employment 
and cultural progress. 'Underdevelopment' is the other side of this proverbial coin - poverty, 
relative income inequality, unemployment and cultural backwardness." DRDLR Green Paper para 
4.2. 
55  "(a) The land acquisition strategy / willing-buyer willing-seller model (a distorted land market); 
(b) a fragmented beneficiary support system; (c) beneficiary selection for land redistribution; (d) 
land administration / governance, especially in communal areas; (e) meeting the 30% 
redistribution target by 2014; (f) declining agricultural contribution to the GDP; (g) unrelenting 
increase in rural unemployment; and, (h) a problematic restitution model and its support system 
(communal property institutions and management)". DRDLR Green Paper para 5. See Pienaar 
2014 PER 652-653. 
56  Du Plessis 2014 PER 800. 
57  Du Plessis 2014 PER 798-800. 
58  Du Plessis 2014 PER 803-806. 
59  Kloppers 2014 PER 709-713. 
60  Kloppers 2014 PER 711. 
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Department of Rural Development and Land Reform of R1.7bn and the backlog in 
commitments of R6.5bn; the backlog in the payment of restitution claims of more 
than R883m; the fruitless and wasteful expenditure of R73m; the failure of the 
Department to get a clean financial audit bill for the sixth year in a row; and the 
failure of government to complete the land audit.61 This points to a systemic failure 
of administration and governance of the current system and not the programme 
itself. As such, it seems convenient to place the blame on the acquisition strategy 
while ignoring the fact that due to mismanagement the current strategy has been 
set up for failure from the beginning. Regarding the meeting of the 30% 
redistribution target by 2014,62 it is impossible to gage the success or failure of 
reaching this target until such time as government is able to produce an accurate 
and up to date land audit. It has even been estimated by the responsible minister 
that government owns between 20% and 30% of the country's land. If this is the 
case, then it can be argued that aside from the results of the land reform 
programme, between 20% and 30% of the land in the country has already moved 
out of the ownership and control of whites and as such the 2014 target has already 
been reached.63 
 
Clause 6 (An Improved Trajectory for Land Reform) 
Clause 6.164 states that land reform should be improved with the goal of disrupting 
food security as little as possible as well as to minimise reform that leads to 
unsustainable benefits for the targeted beneficiaries. Clause 6.265 sets out the 
envisioned supporting programmes and institutions envisaged for the trajectory of 
                                        
61  Mkhwanazi 2011 http://www.thenewage.co.za/30129-1007-53-Land_Affairs_'in_sorry_state'. 
62  Kloppers and Pienaar 2014 PER 677-679. 
63  See in general Kloppers 2014 PER 711-713. 
64  "In articulating this improved trajectory for land reform, a set of proposals is advanced, which 
attempts to: (a) improve on past and current land reform perspectives, without significantly 
disrupting agricultural production and food security; and, (b) to avoid or minimise land 
redistribution and restitution which do not generate sustainable livelihoods, employment and 
incomes." DRDLR Green Paper para 6.1.  
65  "This trajectory is supported by the following programmes and institutions: (a) a recapitalisation 
and development programme; (b) a single land tenure system with four tiers; (c) a Land 
Management Commission; (d) a Land Valuer-General; (e) a Land Rights Management Board, 
with local management committees; (f) properly aligned common property institutions (CPls); 
and, (g) the Land Tenure Security Bill. 2010, which is an integral part of the Land Reform 
Programme (LRP), but is treated separately from it." DRDLR Green Paper para 6.2. 
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land reform that seem productive in general, except insofar as it includes 
problematical issues addressed elsewhere in this submission, especially with regard 
to the land tenure system and the powers given to the Land-Valuer General. 
 
Clause 6.366 describes the creation and implementation of a Recapitalisation and 
Development Programme that will support land reform farms with the goal of 
achieving 100% success with the aim to address issues retrospectively from 1994. 
Clause 6.467 sets out the land-tenure framework and contains highly problematical 
terminology. The general connotations to tenure, leasehold and freehold point to the 
feudal system of land tenure and not ownership. It is suggested that government re-
evaluate the use of these terms and concepts and rather make use of more modern 
property and ownership orientated concepts. In general, the proposal that state and 
public land be managed by means of a system of leasehold is sound.68 This will 
ensure that state and public land can remain productive and be managed better. I 
would recommend that certain mechanisms be built into the leasehold structure to 
allow the termination of leasehold if the land is not used productively for the 
purposes for which it was leased and does not promote the general goals of the land 
reform programme. However, I would like to caution against the unnecessary 
hoarding of land by government when such land can be effectively transferred to 
South African citizens who are able to make productive use thereof. The reform of 
land that is not directly utilised by government for a public purpose should be seen 
as an integral part of the land reform programme and not only the target of moving 
                                        
66  "A Recapitalisation and Development Programme. The goal of this Programme is to ensure that 
all land reform farms are 100% productive. It focuses on all land reform farms acquired through 
state funds since 1994, as well as small-holder farms which had been privately acquired, but the 
new owners have had no means of keeping them productive. The strategy underlying the 
Programme is partnership with commercial farmers on a risk-sharing basis." DRDLR Green Paper 
para 6.3. 
67  "A single land tenure framework has been fashioned out, integrating the current multiple forms 
of land ownership - communal, state, public and private - into a single 4-tier tenure system: (a) 
State and public land: Leasehold; (b) Privately owned land: Freehold, with limited extent; (c) 
Land owned by Foreigners: Freehold, but Precarious Tenure, with obligations and conditions to 
comply with; and, (d) Communally owned land: Communal Tenure, with institutionalised use 
rights. The Communal Land Tenure (the 4th Tier), because of (a) its complexity (need for 
extensive consultations and constitutional compliance) and, (b) the recent nullification of the 
Communal Land Rights Act (CLaRA) by the Constitutional Court, will be treated in a separate 
policy articulation." DRDLR Green Paper para 6.4. 
68  See in general Matlala 2014 PER 851-854. 
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land out of white ownership. It is questionable whether it is necessary for 
government to attempt to administer the land, and if government has the capacity 
to effectively administer productive agricultural land by not transferring it to private 
ownership of citizens. 
 
Concerning the proposal that privately owned land be held in freehold, the 
vagueness of the wording and especially the reference to it being of "limited extent" 
is troubling. The perception is created that the Green Paper plans to place extra 
limitations on ownership that could possibly be unconstitutional.  
 
The vagueness of the limitation of ownership of land held by foreigners is 
problematic. I would like to highlight the possible investment and economic 
implications of limiting the ownership of property by foreigners. There is also 
uncertainty about the implementation of this measure. Will it entail limitation of 
foreign ownership in the future or would it apply to current owners? It is proposed 
that this be approached with circumspection and that more clarity should be given to 
this issue. While the practice of limiting the ownership or land interests of foreigners 
is successfully implemented in certain other countries, the constitutional obligation to 
compensate owners if they are expropriated should always be borne in mind. If 
government should choose to take away full ownership from foreigners who 
currently own land in South Africa, this could constitute expropriation rather than 
deprivation, for which compensation would have to be paid. Such compensation 
should be budgeted for. 
 
Regarding the classification of communally owned land as communal tenure, I 
support the recognition of this as an exceedingly complex matter that would need 
extensive consultations, and support the idea that this issue will be dealt with in 
separate policy documents. However, I would like to highlight the large systemic 
problems with the current communal land holding system, especially the issues 
raised by stakeholders that individuals living on communal land would prefer 
individual ownership rights. 
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Clause 6.5 (Land Management Commission (LMC))69 
Clouse 6.5 sets out the creation of the Land Management Commission, which does 
not seem to be problematic except for the issues as raised below. Clause 6.5.170 sets 
out the proposed functions of the LMC, and a number of serious questions are raised 
by Pienaar.71 Clause 6.5.272 sets out the proposed powers of the LMC and does not 
seem problematic, except for the powers contained in Sub-Clauses 6.5.2 (c), (e) and 
(f). The powers to "verify and / or validate / invalidate individual or corporate title 
deeds"; grant amnesty and / or to initiate prosecution, whichever the case might be, 
at its own discretion; and the power to seize or confiscate land gotten through 
fraudulent or corrupt means are powers which should be dealt with by the judiciary 
in terms of (c) and by the prosecuting authority in the case of (e) and (f) with the 
possibility of judicial oversight. The setting aside of title by an extra-judicial body in 
the context of the constitutionally guaranteed right to have a dispute resolved by a 
court of law, together with the effects that these powers will have on the South-
African land-ownership system are highly problematic as well as patently 
unconstitutional.73 
 
                                        
69  "The LMC will be autonomous, but not independent, of the Ministry and Department. It will be 
accountable to the Ministry through the Department; and, will submit regular reports to the 
latter. A financial manager, accountable to the Department's Accounting Officer, will manage the 
finances of the Commission. The LMC will be composed of all stakeholders in land and persons 
appointed by the Minister because of their special attributes." DRDLR Green Paper para 6.5. 
Pienaar 2014 PER 655. 
70  "Functions of the LMC (a) Advisory - issues advisory opinions, research reports and guidelines on 
land management to all land related departments and state organs. (b) Coordination - ensures 
alignment, inter-linkages and coherence of disparate land management agencies, departments, 
spheres and other organs of state. (c) Regulatory - Manage the regulatory environment that 
ensures that lands are managed in a manner that will protect the quality and values. (d) Auditing 
- assures the integrity of the inventory of state and public lands including monitoring its uses. (e) 
Reference point." DRDLR Green Paper para 6.5.1. See Pienaar 2014 PER 655-656; Mostert 2014 
PER 760. 
71  Pienaar 2014 PER 655-656. 
72  "Powers of the LMC - The LMC will have power to: (a) subpoena anyone and any entity, private 
or public, to appear before it, and answer any question relating to its landholding or land 
interest; (b) enquire about any land question, out of its own initiative or at the instance of 
interested parties; (c) verify and or validate I invalidate individual or corporate title deeds; (d) 
demand a declaration of any landholding, with all the necessary documentation relevant to such 
a declaration; (e) grant amnesty and or to initiate prosecution, whichever the case might be, at 
its own discretion; and, (f) seize or confiscate land gotten through fraudulent or corrupt means." 
DRDLR Green Paper para 6.5.2.  
73  See also Pienaar 2014 PER 655-6565; Mostert 2014 PER 760, 779-780. 
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Clause 6.6 (The Land Valuer-General (LVG))74 
Clause 6.6 concerns the creation of the Land Valuer-General and the initial problem 
statement in Clause 6.6.175 clearly makes out a case for the creation of such a 
institution. Clause 6.6.276 sets out the proposed responsibilities of the Office of the 
Valuer-General (OVG), which seem unproblematic in general, except for the first two 
responsibilities contained in 6.6.2(a) and (b). I would like to express my unease with 
removing the full capacity of valuing land from the public and market sphere and 
artificially imposing compulsory valuations on the market. The final determination of 
financial compensation in cases of expropriation should also not be removed from 
the sphere of the market and ultimately ousting the courts from the determining of 
value for purposes of expropriation. Even though it is stated that the compensation 
will be determined in compliance with the Constitution, it will clearly be 
unconstitutional due to the fact that Section 25 of the Constitution states that in the 
absence of an agreement being reached by the parties, the question of 
compensation has to be decided or approved by a Court.77 
 
                                        
74  Pienaar 2014 PER 656; Mostert 2014 PER 760; Du Plessis 2014 PER 806. 
75  "Problem Statement (a) South Africa lacks a nationwide comprehensive, reliable and collated hub 
of property values; (b) absence of legislative framework to determine when 'market value' is one 
of the variables in determining values as opposed to being the only criterion; (c) probity of some 
of the valuation is questionable; (d) conflict of interest and malpractices; (e) improper or hurried 
valuations in order to meet deadlines or compliance planning; and, (f) an ahistorical or 
mechanical approach to valuation." DRDLR Green Paper para 6.6.1.  
76  "Responsibilities of the Office of the Valuer-General (OVG) The Valuer-General will be a statutory 
office responsible for: (a) the provision of fair and consistent land values for rating and taxing 
purposes; (b) determining financial compensation in cases of land expropriation, under the 
Expropriation Act or any other policy and legislation, in compliance with the constitution; (c) the 
provision of specialist valuation and property-related advice to government; (d) setting norms 
and standards, and monitoring service delivery; (e) undertaking market and sales analysis; (f) 
setting guidelines, norms and standards required to validate the integrity of the valuation data; 
and, (g) creating and maintaining a data-base of valuation information." DRDLR Green Paper 
para 6.6.2. See Pienaar 2014 PER 656; Du Plessis 2014 PER 810-819. 
77  "Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application – (b) subject to 
compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment of which have either 
been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court." Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 S25(2). See also Du Plessis 2014 PER 810-819. 
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Clause 6.7 (Land Rights Management Board (LRMB) and Land Rights Management 
Committees (LRMCs))78 
Clause 6.7.179 concerns the composition of the LRMB. The only issue here is that the 
content of the composition and identification of "representatives of sectors which 
hold rights to land" should be clarified so as to ensure a democratic representation. 
Clause 6.7.280 mentions the proposed functions of the LRMC and Clause 6.7.381 sets 
out the proposed powers of the LRMB. 
 
Clause 7 (The Strategic Thrust of Land Reform)82 
I agree in general with the contents of this clause. However, it is clear from the 
general inconsistencies and tension between the focus on Land Reform on the one 
hand and Rural Development on the other hand that these two areas are not really 
capable of being properly promoted within the same framework. 
                                        
78  Pienaar 2014 PER 657. 
79  "The LRMB will be composed of representatives of sectors which hold rights to land and persons 
appointed by the Minister because of their special knowledge and capacity to provide 
professional services to the Board. The Land Rights Management Committees, on the other 
hand, will be composed of representatives of residents in a specific rural environment or 
settlement: farm-workers and dwellers, commercial farmers, relevant municipal councils, 
government departments such as the drdlr, Human Settlements, as well as the South African 
Police Service." DRDLR Green Paper para 6.7.1. 
80  "Functions of the LRMB (a) communication of legal reforms to farm owners, farm-dwellers and 
potential land beneficiaries; (b) build institutional capacity (inside and outside state institutions) 
to advise and support rights-holders, and facilitate their active use of the law; (c) in collaboration 
with the Chief Deeds Registrar, develop accessible and efficient systems for recording and 
registering rights on land; (d) to encourage the primacy of social solutions to social problems 
and disputes; (e) to provide legal representation, where necessary, e. g. unlawful evictions; and, 
(f) to establish a co-ordinated and integrated support system for state, civil society and private 
sector participation in integrated development measures in rural settlements." DRDLR Green 
Paper para 6.7.2. 
81  "Powers of the LRMB The LRMB will have power to: (a) establish and, or, dissolve Land Rights 
Management Committees (LRMCs); (b) set norms and standards for the LRMCs; (c) delegate 
certain powers to the LRMCs; (d) enforce compliance with norms and standards, as well as land 
rights management policies and laws; (d) hear appeals on matters handled by the LRMCs; (e) to 
over-turn decisions of the LRMCs; and, (f) enforce respect for, and observance of, rights of 
fellow dwellers." DRDLR Green Paper para 6.7.3.  
82  "7.1 Land Reform is located within the CRDP, and is anchored by the following pillars: (a) a 
coordinated and integrated broad-based agrarian transformation; (b) an improved land reform 
programme; and, (c) strategic investment in economic, cultural, ICT and social infrastructure for 
the benefit of all rural communities. 7.2 While separate in the design, rural development and 
land reform are aligned at policy, programme and institutional levels to ensure coordinated 
service delivery. In pursuit of agrarian transformation, the link between the land question and 
agriculture is acknowledged as the basis of the search for an economic rationale and a vision of 
a post-reform agrarian structure. Yet, demand for land may be for other productive but non-
agricultural uses."  DRDLR Green Paper paras 7.1-7.2. See Pienaar 2014 PER 650. 
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Clause 8 (Land Experience Elsewhere)83 
The contents of this clause are extremely vague and do not add any substance to 
the Green Paper, since it does not evaluate, analyse or give any conclusions to the 
comparative case. It is proposed that it be removed in its entirely or completely 
rewritten and properly argued so that it clearly illustrates its relevance to the South 
African situation.  
 
Clause 9 (Challenges and Constraints)84 
I agree with the contents of this clause. However its emphasis on a speedy 
resolution of the land question is unjustified. It is submitted that haste should not be 
a factor in the implementation of a new system, since the results could once again 
be deemed unsatisfactory even after a decade of first implementation. 
 
                                        
83  "8.1 Asia 8.1.1 China China replaced the Commune System with a two-layer management 
system - household contract responsibility system and granting farmers self-management rights; 
it replaced monopoly over purchase and marketing, allowing farmers the right to exchange farm 
produce freely; and, it transformed the single collective ownership into various private 
ownerships, where the farmer can dispose of assets. 8.1.2 India India introduced the following 
reforms: it regulated sharecropping; provided legal protection against eviction; instituted a land 
ceiling Act; and provided homestead plots. 8.2 Latin America 8.2.1 Brazil Brazil embarked upon 
selective expropriation with compensation; viable family smallholder farms receiving government 
support, serving domestic market, while large-scale commercial farms serve export markets; 
and, combined market-related strategies with traditional land management systems, in a 
complementary manner. 8.2.2 Mexico  Mexico had mixed experiences: nationalisation in 1910; 
redistribution in 1935; denationalisation in 1946; and, a peasant revolt in 1970 resulted in the 
take-over of land owned by foreigners, turning it into collectives. 8.2.3 Chile Chile expropriated 
large farms in the 1960s, turning them into co-operatives for peasants and small farmers. There 
was a reversal in 1974, after the assassination of President Allende, with the re-instatement of 
elite family farms. Regulatory reforms were introduced on land rentals and subdivisions in the 
1980s. 8.3 Africa On the African continent the Egyptian experience provides interesting lessons 
on land reform. Legislation was passed in the 1950s, limiting farm size to a maximum of 42ha 
per individual; limiting rental rates; and, setting minimum lease durations." DRDLR Green Paper 
para 8. 
84  "9.1 For the land reform programme to proceed rapidly and succeed, as it must, a number of 
challenges and constraints have to be confronted, and overcome. The main challenges are: (a) 
entrenched vested interests, in both the commercial and communal land spaces; and, (b) poor 
co-ordination and integration of effort and resources among public institutions, and between 
public and private sector institutions; and, (c) the main constraint is the poor capacity of organs 
of state to implement. 9.2 These three elements constitute a complex risk-factor to any effective, 
equitable and speedy resolution of the land question. It will require time and an enduring, 
collective, national political effort to overcome them. Co-ordination and integration across all 
relevant organs of state and civil society is the key to a successful execution of the sustainable 
land reform programme." DRDLR Green Paper para 9. 
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Clause 10 (Summary and Conclusion)85 
I would like to reiterate the problem of making broad sweeping statements. In Sub-
clause 10.1 reference is made to "undoing the social, economic and cultural effects 
of CENTURIES of discrimination and exclusion" (emphasis added). Referring to the 
discussion of this issue at the beginning of this paper, it would seem as if the Green 
Paper reiterates the position that land reform aims to address all issues regarding 
                                        
85  "10.1 Undoing the social, economic and cultural effects of centuries of discrimination and 
exclusion, on the basis of race, class and gender will take time and an enduring national political 
effort. 10.2 Challenges and constraints experienced over the last seventeen years, and lessons 
drawn from other countries across the world, show clearly that there are no silver bullets to 
solving post-colonial land questions. 10.3 A systems approach seems necessary and appropriate 
in addressing complex and emotive challenges such land reform. The failure to protect the rights 
and security of tenure of farm workers and dwellers is a good illustration of this point. There is a 
strong view that the real problem in land reform in general; and, in the protection of the rights 
and security of tenure of farm-dwellers, in particular, may be that of a total-system failure (TSF) 
rather than that of a single piece of legislation, e.g., Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA). 
10.4 In the case of farm-workers and dwellers, this failure would reflect in a number of aspects: 
inadequate articulation of policy and legislative regime to protect farm workers and dwellers; 
poor implementation of existing policies and legislation by organs of the state; weak 
enforcement of legislation by law-enforcement agencies; the judicial system not being worker-
friendly in handling eviction cases; labour unions not organizing effectively on farms; non-
complementary (almost adversarial) relationship between non-governmental organizations and 
state organs in addressing problems of farm-dwellers; and, poor or non-existent monitoring, co-
ordination and communication amongst state organs, within and across the three spheres of 
government, and other interested parties. on matters negatively affecting the rights of farm 
workers and dwellers. 10.5 The following passages, directly and indirectly quoting the first 
President of the African National Congress, Dr John Langalibalele Dube, have been taken from 
the recently published book by Heather Hughes, First President (2011). It addresses the hunger 
and need for land by African people. The situation has not changed much since the 1930s, when 
the sentiment was expressed by Dr Dube. We must change it now! The points that Dube and his 
colleagues had made about the draft legislation (Natives' Representation in Parliament Bill, the 
Natives' Land Bill and the Natives' Council Bill) were incorporated and extended in his testimony 
to the Natives' Economic Commission. He had prepared a written submission on which he was 
closely questioned at great length in the hearing. Uppermost in his mind and, he said, in the 
minds of African people was the land issue. They needed far more of it, particularly those who 
could not afford to buy. The land ought to be purchased for them and handed over; all the 
African areas ought to be properly surveyed and divided into building plots, grazing grounds and 
gardens. People could pay a nominal rent for their plots. 'There are only one million of you and 
there are about six millions of us; and one million of you have three fourths of the land, and six 
millions of us have one fourth of the land. That is not fair .... In asking (for more land) I do not 
think we are asking for charity; we have contributed to the development of South Africa with our 
labour... we have done our share in that respect, and in the matter of taxation, both direct and 
indirect'. He vigorously fought off the commissioners' views that Africans did not know how to 
use their land properly, that any more would just be wasted, that Africans multiplied too fast, 
that they had too many cattle: 'The black ox has nowhere to feed, and the white ox has all the 
pasture … I am sorry if I cannot make that clear to you'. [Heather Hughes (2011). First 
President. A Life of John L Dube, founding President of the ANC]." DRDLR Green Paper para 10. 
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dislocation from land for the past few hundred years. Quite clearly this is untenable 
and should be clarified. 
 
In Sub-clause 10.4 a section is inserted in the conclusion about the case of farm-
workers and dwellers. This sub-clause is out of place and should not be part of the 
conclusion. It once again illustrates the problem of trying to address both land 
reform and rural development in the same document. Sub-clause 10.5 also does not 
add any substance to the Green Paper and does not help to bring any clarity to the 
real conclusion to be reached from this Paper. 
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